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Abstract 
We propose a modal action logic that combines ideas from H.A. Simon’s bounded rationality, 
S. Kripke’s possible world semantics, G.H. von Wright’s preference logic, Pratt’s dynamic logic, 
Stalnaker’s minimal change and more recent approaches to update semantics. ALX (the xth action 
logic) is sound, complete and decidable, making it the first complete logic for two-place preference 
operators. ALX avoids important drawbacks of other action logics, especially the counterintuitive 
necessitation rule for goals (every theorem must be a goal) and the equally counterintuitive 
closure of goals under logical implication. 
1. Introduction 
Action logics are usually developed for (hypothetical) use by intelligent robots [ 6,14, 
40,59,71], as a description language of program behavior [ 24,471, or as a contribution 
to philosophical logic [64]. Our effort is motivated by a different concern. We want 
to develop a formal language for social science theories, especially for theories of 
organizations. The difference in motivation leads to a new approach to action logic. We 
combine ideas from various strands of thought, notably H.A. Simon’s notion of bounded 
rationality, G.H. Wright’s approach to preferences, Kripke’s possible world semantics 
in combination with binary modal operators, Pratt’s dynamic logic, Stalnaker’s notion of 
minimal change, and more recent ideas from belief revision and update semantics [ 15, 
251. Although fairly simple in its construction, ALX is good at handling some crucial 
problems of action logic. In particular, ALX avoids the counterintuitive necessitation 
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rule for goals (every theorem must be a goal) and the equally counterintuitive closure 
of goals under logical implication. ALX is complete, decidable and enjoys the finite 
model property. 
2. The framework for ALX 
Most social science theories are expressed in natural language. They lack a formal 
scaffold that would allow one to check their consistency in a rigorous fashion, or 
to disambiguate natural language statements. As a consequence, these theories have 
acquired a reputation for “softness’‘-a soft way of saying that their logical properties 
are somewhat dubious. Reformulating them in a formal language with known properties 
would make consistency checking or disambiguation easier. Also, it would pave the 
way for other tasks, such as the examination of a theory’s deductive closure properties. 
Understanding the deductive closure properties of a set of formulas is essential to 
automating the generation of theories from a given set of assumptions and introducing 
AI into theory building [45]. 
We focus on action logic as a formal language, because actions of individual or 
collective agents are key to the understanding of social phenomena. In fact, most social 
scientists agree that adequate theories of social relations must be action theories [ 1,12, 
16,39,52,61]. Yet actions engender change and change is notoriously hard to grasp in 
the extensional context of first order languages [ 111. This drives our attempt to develop 
a new logic, rather than taking First-Order Logic off the shelf. We call the new logic 






Fig. I. Simon’s bounded mtionality 
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Herbert A. Simon’s conceptualization of bounded rationality [65] serves as a point 
of departure (see Fig. 1). His approach is intuitively appealing and had great impact on 
the postwar social sciences. Simon wanted to overcome the omniscience claims of the 
traditional conceptualizations of rational action. He assumed (1) an agent, with (2) a 
set of behavior alternatives, (3) a set of future states of affairs (each such state being 
the outcome of a choice among the behavior alternatives), and (4) a preference order 
over future states of affairs. The omniscient agent, endowed with “perfect rationality”, 
would know all behavior alternatives and the exact outcome of each alternative; the 
agent would also have a complete preference order for those outcomes. An agent with 
bounded rationality, in contrast, would not know all the alternatives, would not know 
the exact outcome of each, and would not have a complete preference order for those 
outcomes. 
Kripke’s possible world semantics provides a natural setting for Simon’s conceptual- 
ization. We assume a set of possible worlds with various relations defined over this set 
(we may also call those possible worlds states). One can see a behavior alternative as 
a mapping from states to states, so each behavior alternative constitutes an accessibility 
relation. An accessibility relation, in turn, can be interpreted as an opportunity for action, 
i.e., as an opportunity for changing the world by moving from a given state to another 
state. Accessibility relations are expressed by one-place modal operators, as in dynamic 
logic [ 241. For example, the formula (a)4 would express the fact that the agent has an 
action a at his disposal such that effecting a in the present situation would result in the 
situation denoted by proposition c$. 
The perfectly rational agent would have a complete description of his actual state, 
a complete knowledge of all accessibility relations and a complete preference order 
over states. Agents with bounded rationality are less well informed. They may have 
an incomplete description of their actual state (we call those descriptions situations), 
incomplete knowledge of the accessibility relations, and an incomplete preference order 
over situations. In particular, one can assume that their knowledge and the range of their 
actions is finite. As it turns out, this assumption is crucial for defining a straightforward 
concept of goal in ALX’s object language. 
Situations are represented as sets of states and expressed by propositions. Propositions, 
in turn, denote the set of states where they obtain. So, the more specific an agent’s 
knowledge about a situation, the more detailed the propositional description of that 
situation would be. The limit case, a complete description, would uniquely identify 
one state. Less specific descriptions would lack that uniqueness, identifying the set of 
those states where the description would hold (but remaining uncommitted about other 
“aspects” not covered by the description). This is the standard approach to representing 
incomplete information, used in denotational semantics [62,63] and epistemic logic 
l201.3 
’ Framing bounded rationality in terms of possible worlds semantics reveals a fine point usually ignored: one 
can see that omniscience-the limiting case-is contingent upon the choice of the language. Full rationality 
in an absolute sense would require a language isormorphic to the universe “out there”, but such a language is 
not available. Any formal theory about full rationality has to make simplifying assumptions about the world, 
but those assumption, by their simplifying nature, violate the ontology of full rationality in some sense or 
another. 
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Preferences-not goals-provide the basis for rational action in ALX. Following von 
Wright [ 721, a preference statement is understood as a statement about situations. For 
example, the statements that “I prefer oranges to apples” is interpreted as the fact that 
“I prefer the states in which I have an orange to the states in which I have an apple.” 
Following von Wright again, we assume that an agent who claims to prefer oranges 
to apples should prefer a situation where he has an orange but no apple to a situation 
where he has an apple but no orange. Preferences are expressed via two-place modal 
operators; if the agent prefers the proposition q5 to the proposition +, we write c$IPI,~. 
Normally, the meaning of a preference statement is context-dependent, even when 
this is not made explicit. An agent may claim to prefer an apple to an orange-and 
actually mean it-but he may prefer an orange to an apple later-perhaps because then 
he already had an apple. To capture this context dependency, we borrow the notion of 
minimal change from Stalnaker’s approach to conditionals [ 681. The idea is to apply 
the conjunction expansion principle only to situations that are minimally different from 
the agent’s present situation-just as different as they really need to be in order to make 
the propositions true about which preferences are expressed. We introduce a binary 
function, cw, to the semantics that determines a set of “closest” states relative to a given 
state, such that the new states fulfill some specified conditions, but resemble the old 
state as much as possible in all other respects. For situations (sets of states), we apply 
cw to each element of the situation separately. This allows us to avoid some technical 
problems arising in conditional logic [ 38,50,68]. 4 
ALX provides a complete syntactic characterization of preferences, so one can de- 
rive new preference statements from old ones by using its machinery. Closing the set 
of preference statements under the rules of inferences yields a preference order that 
serves as the basis for deriving goals. Goals, in turn, are defined in terms of prefer- 
ences and accessibilities (we will argue that there are several plausible goal definitions, 
corresponding to increasingly stronger notions of rationality). Note that goals need not 
be unique; this follows from the fact that world descriptions and preference orders are 
usually incomplete. Also, the goal set need not be closed under logical implication, 
so agents need not treat undesired consequences of desired outcomes (e.g., pain as a 
consequence of having one’s teeth repaired) as goals (as opposed to action logics that 
use the concept of “goal” as the primitive notion of rational guidance). 
3. Formal syntax and semantics 
3.1. Syntax 
ALX is a multimodal propositional logic. The propositional alphabet consists of a 
countable set of lower-case Latin symbols pi to denote primitive propositions. The action 
alphabet has a finite set of actions ai. Lower-case Greek letters 4, +, p, . . . (with or 
without subscript) denote well-formed formulae. We have (a)$ to denote the one-place 
existential accessibility relation for action a and P to denote the two-place preference 
4 The reader is referred to the discussion part of this paper for details. 
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relation. o serves as two-place operator for updates; updates are changes caused by an 
action. Note that updates in ALX refer to real state changes, not epistemological ones 
[ 151, so an update does not produce a new knowledge state, but a new situation. 
Definition 1 (Syntax). Let ATOM = {pi : i < o} and ACTION = {al,. . . , uk} for 
some k E w with w standing for the ordinality of natural numbers. The set of formulae 
FML is defined recursively as follows: 
l ATOM c: FML, 
l ~#JEFML++EFML, 
. q&G E FML+ (4r\t,b) E FML, 
l q5 E FML, a E ACTION + ((u)qS) E FML, 
. q&e E FML+ (c$ot+b) EFML, 
l $, 1,4 E FML =+ (c$P@) E FML. 
Define 1 as 4 A -4 for an arbitrary 4, and [a]4 as l(a)+. Define the Boolean 
connectives {V, +, H} and the truth constant T from the given Boolean connectives in 
the usual way. 
3.2. Semantics 
Definition 2 (ALX models). We call M = (W; cw, >, {R’}aE~~,~~, V) an ALX model 
if: 
l W is a set of possible worlds, 
l cw : W x P(W) + P(W) is a closest world function, 
0 * C P(W) x P(W) is a comparison relation for preferences, 
l R” C W x W is an accessibility relation for each a in ACTION, 
l V : ATOM + P(W) is an assignment function for primitive propositions, 
and if M satisfies the following conditions: 
(CSl) cw(w,X) c x. 
(CS2) w E x =+ cw(w,X) = {w}. 
(CSC) CW(W,~) nYc 
(NORM) (8 Y x>, (x $0). 
(TRAN) cw(w,Xrlr) cw(w,Ynx) and + cw(w,ZnY) 
+ CW(W,xnZ) + cw(w,z nX), 
where r = W - Ii 
(CSl ), (CS2) and (CSC) constrain the closest world function. (CSl) ensures that 
the closest +-worlds (relative to a given world) are indeed +-worlds; (CS2) ensures 
that w is its own (and unique) closest &-world if r#~ is true at w. (CSC) says that if 
@ is true at the closest &world, then the closest +-world is also a closest &and+- 
world. (NORM) and (TRAN) constrain the semantic preference relation. They require 
normality and transitivity; “normality” stipulates that no comparison between two sets 
of worlds would involve an empty set of worlds. 
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In the following, we will use M = (W, cw, +, R”, V) to denote M = (W, cw, +, 
{R”}aE~~~~~, V) if the omission causes no ambiguity. 
Definition 3 (Interpretation function). Let FML be as above and let A4 = (w cw, 
t, R”, V) be an ALX model. The interpretation function [ilM : FML + P(W) is 
defined as follows: 
uPin‘+4 = V(Pi) 3 
u-a4 =w \ udl,. 
u(+bn, = {W E w : 3~’ E W(R’ww’ and W’ E u4n,)j, 
[I4 0 @I, = {W E w : 3~’ E W(W’ E pn, and w E CW(W’, n$j,))}, 
umbn,={WE w :cw(w,u~~~~) +~~b+ewn~)~. 
The interpretation of the primitive propositions and the Boolean connectives is straight- 
forward. A proposition letter pi evaluates to the set of worlds where pi obtains, the 
negation of a proposition C$ evaluates to the complement of the &worlds, and the con- 
junction of q5 and ti evaluates to the intersection of the &worlds and the +-worlds. 
The interpretation of (a)~$ yields the set of worlds from where the agent can access at 
least one &world via action a. We use the “existential” version of the action modality, 
because real-life decisions typically depend on the possibility of a specific action in a 
specific situation. 
The interpretation of 4 o $ yields the set of worlds where + holds so that one could 
have got there from a closest e%world. Note that 4 o II, is a backward-looking operator 
[ 151. Note also that 4 o Cc, is closely related to the intensional conditional (“wiggle”) 
known from Stalnaker’s and D. Lewis’ work [ 38,681, where qb +-+ $ is meant to 
express “if 4 were the case, then $ would be the case”. 5 One can express (although 
not term-define) the wiggle in terms of the update operator via the so-called Ramsey 
rule [ 151: 
I- (/I+ (4-$)) e I- ((x04) -9). 
The interpretation of @P$ yields the set of worlds where the agent prefers (at each 
of those worlds) the closest +-and-not-$-worlds to the closest @-and-not-&worlds. 
Define the forcing relation as: 
Definition 4 (The logic ALX). Let FML be as above, let Mod be the class of all ALX 
models and let [I I], be as above too, defined for every model M E Mod. We call the 
logic ALX = (FML,Mod, [I nM) ALX logic. 
5 In fact, in Stalnaker, the “wiggle” is a “corner” (>); we prefer the --+ because it frees the > for other 
uses. 
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Define the semantic consequence relation, k, as usual: 
M=(W,cw,t,RO,V)~~~(~wEW)(M,wII-~). 
k+r&(VyEr)(M+y). 
Mod(r) & {M E Mod: M k I-}. 
I- + qf~ k% Mod(r) C Mod({qb}). 
Definitions 2-4 provide a semantic characterization of ALX. The next definition 
provides a complete syntactic characterization. 
Definition 5 (ALX inference system). Let ALXS be the following set of axioms and 


















all propositional tautologies. 
(a)I HI 
(a)(+ V+) H (a)$ V (a)@ 
(a)(4A(CI) + (a)4 A (aM 
40* -@ 
+A* -+ +o* 
-(40~)3-(J-o4) 
(4V9) ox ++ ~OXV~OX 
(+A$) o$ -4 
(4o*) AX + 4o(tiAxx) 
4W H (+A+)P(+AG) 
(w4) A (9Px) -+ (Wx) 
3~W),-($P~) 
l-4& l-4+@ =+ I-@ 
I- 4 + I- [aI4 
I- (44 & I- 4 --) ICI =+ I- (a)@ 
I- 4 O CCI & I- 4 + 4 * I- 4 O * 
I- (4 ++ 4’) * I- ((44) H ((a)$‘) 
I- (4 H 4’) & I- (Ic, ++ G’> =+ I- (4 ofi) c-f (4 occI’> 
I- (4 * 4’) & I- (ti ++ 4) * I- (WbI) H (4W’) 
Most axioms are straightforward. As usual, we have the propositional tautologies 
(BA). Since ALX is a normal modal logic, the absurdum is not true anywhere, so it 
is not accessible (Al). The action modalities behave as usual, so they distribute over 
disjunction both ways, but over conjunction only in one direction (A2) and (A3). 
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Indeed, we can get to &or-$-worlds via action a if and only if we can get via a to 
a &world or to a $-world. However, being able to get to &worlds via action a and 
being able to get to $-worlds via action a does not necessarily mean that a can get us 
to a world that is both 4 and $. 
As mentioned above, o is a backward-looking operator. So, a successful $-update 
ends up in a G-world (Ul) and the truth of both 4 and Ic, at a world allows us to 
perform a vacuous $-update, i.e., to remain at that world (U2). (U3) reiterates the 
normality condition for updates. Since there is no world where the absurdum is true, 
an update with the absurdum cannot succeed. (U4) posits the left distribution of the 
disjunction over the update operator. The intuition is that if we have got to a X-world 
from a 4- or a $-world, we have updated either from a &world or from a G-world. 
(U5) tells us that a void update is not going to change any conditions. (U6) posits 
that if x holds after updating 4 with *, then we can update 4 with I/I A x and obtain 
the same result. Readers more familiar with closest world functions may already sense 
how the update operator will mimic the closest world function in the syntax, helping to 
construct a canonical model in the completeness proof. 
The axioms for the preference operator posit the conjunction expansion principle 
(CEP), transitivity (TR), and normality (N). So, if we prefer $ to r~?, we will also 
prefer the absence of Cc, to the absence of 4. If we prefer 4 to $, we are apt to 
prefer &and-not-$ to +G-and-not+. We have transitivity because we think that it is 
a natural principle of preference orders. Normality is required to avoid inconsistent 
preference statements. For example, without normality, we get a violation of irreflexivity 
via the only-if part of the contraposition principle. 6 We need not state irreflexivity as 
an axiom, since it is derivable from (CEP) and (N) . By the same token, we can derive 
contraposition and asymmetry for the preference operator. 
Proposition 6 (More properties of the preference operator). The following formulas 
are theorems of ALX: 
Proof. See Appendix A. Cl 
We have modus ponens and the necessitation rule for the universal action modality 
(NECA) and monotonicity for the existential action modality. For the update operator, 
we have left monotonicity, but not right monotonicity, the intuition being that a move 
from a &world to the closest e-world w might end up at a different world than the move 
to the closest @‘-world even if J, implies $’ at w. Logically equivalent propositions are 
h An alternative method for preserving consistency, suggested by von Wright [72 ] and used by Hansson 
[ 221, requires the “independence” of propositions in certain axioms. We have used this approach in [28], but 
it is less straightforward because the definition of “independence” is nontrivial. 
2 Huang et al./Art@cial Intelligence 82 (1996) 75-127 83 
substitutible in action, update and preference formulas (SUBA), (SUBU), (SUBP). 
Note that we do not have monotonicity for preferences. Because of this, we are able to 
avoid the counterintuitive deductive closure of goals. 
4. Formal properties of ALX 
ALX has pleasant logical properties. We have: 
Proposition 7 (Soundness of ALXS) . ALXS is sound, i.e., for an arbitrary set of 
formulas A and an arbitrary formula 4, 
Proof. See Appendix A. 0 
Next, we have: 
Proposition 8 (Completeness of ALXS). ALX is complete, i.e., for an arbitrary set of 
formulas A and an arbitrary formula c$, 
Proof. See Appendix A. 0 
Furthermore, ALX is decidable. Stronger even, we have the finite model property 
for ALX, that is, for each non-theorem $ there exists a finite model that provides a 
counterexample for 9. Since ALX is recursively axiomatizable, this means that ALX is 
decidable. 
Definition 9 (Finite model property). A logic S is said to have the finite model prop- 
erty, iff, for arbitrary 4 such that ks 4, there exists a finite model M such that: 
(1) Iw(M,w I/- -@), 
(2) Vp(I-s P =+ VJw(M, w I/- P)). 
Theorem 10. ALX has the$nite model property. 
Proof. See Appendix A. q 
ALXS is finite, so ALX is finitely axiomatizable. The finite model property together 
with finite axiomatizability imply decidability (cf. [ 3 1, p. 1531. As a consequence, we 
have: 
Corollary 11. ALX is decidable. 
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5. Applying ALX 
ALX provides considerable flexibility in defining new modal operators by using the 
three primitive operators. We concentrate on operators of potential use in defining goals. 
In the following, we assume that the preference order of an agent is finite and hence 
the corresponding set of preference statements. Call this set 27~. Recall furthermore that 
the range of action alternatives is finite, too (as stipulated in Definition 1). Suppose 
that 2p = ($1, . . . , I,&}. In the following, we use the notation V@@(r,&) (where @(I/J) 
is an formula that contains fi) to denote @(+I ) A . . . A @(I),,,) and 3+P(@) to denote 
@($I) V...V@(&l). 
Define accessibility as follows: 
Definition 12 (Accessibility). Let A+ stand for the fact that situation (b is accessible 
via an action. Define: 
def 
A+ * (al)4 V (a2)+ V.. V (ak)+. 
Thus, operator A acts as an existential quantifier over action terms; if situation 4 
is accessible via an arbitrary action, then we have A$. Note how bounded rationality 
impinges on this definition. In defining accessibility we can stay inside the object 
language because we assume that agents are not omnipotent and have only finitely 
many action alternatives at their disposal. 
Define a “good” situation 4 as a situation that the agent prefers to its negation and 
conversely for a “bad” situation. 
Definition 13 (Good, bad situations). Let GO4 stand for a “good” situation 4 and 
BA+ for a “bad” situation 4. Define: 
Define an element of the agent’s preference order in the obvious way: 
Definition 14 (Element of the preference order). Let FYI+ stand for an element in the 
agent’s preference order. Define: 
5.1. Goals 
Goals are a crucial notion for action logics. Following the basic notions of bounded 
rationality (and, for that matter, standard decision theory), we derive goals from prefer- 
ences; they are not a primitive notion as in other action logics. But there are many ways 
to base goals on preferences. A situation may be singled out as a goal simply because it 
is better than its negation, or, perhaps, because it is better than other situations; it may 
be satisficing, outstanding (extremal), or optimal. Bounded rationality is often identified 
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with the notion that agents do not optimize, at least not in the sense of putting much 
energy into the search for extremal solutions; instead, they are said to satisfice. However, 
the reduction of bounded rationality to satisficing is misleading. Satisficing is, indeed, 
relevant when the existence, or the accessibility, of potential goal states is unknown. 
If a known alternative meets a given aspiration level, then, as a rule, the agent will 
not search for a better state; conversely, if no known alternative meets the aspiration 
level, the agent will search for better solutions, at least up to a certain point. However, 
agents might act irrational if they do not pursue known better accessible alternatives; 
if they never do, aspiration levels could only go down). Bounded rationality has been 
introduced in order to develop a more realistic framework of rational decision making, 
and a drive for improving one’s situation is apparent in many human decisions. 
We present four goal definitions (good, satisficing, extremal, optimal), and discuss 
some obvious modifications of these definitions. 
Agents might opt for a state simply because it is better than its negation, particularly 
if only a few alternatives are considered. For example, if an agent finds himself late 
at night far from home without a car, he might base his decision to take a taxi on the 
simple deliberation that it is better to take a taxi than not to take a taxi. A “good” goal 
can be defined by using the “good” operator GO: 
Definition 15 (Good goal). Let Gg4 denote the fact that $I is a good goal. Define: 
Gg+ & GO+. 
Thus a good goal is a situation that is preferred to its negation. 
The second definition involves a satisficing goal. As noted above, satisficing-impor- 
tant as it is-is a procedural addendum to the definition of bounded rationality. Whereas 
the declarative part of bounded rationality concerns incomplete knowledge, the proce- 
dural part concerns the question of what to do when the knowledge is not complete 
enough [ 671. So, satisficing states are, in fact, satisfactory states made accessible via 
search. Let S4 stand for an arbitrary satisficing situation 4 and relax the definition of 
action terms by allowing for mnemonic expressions: 
S4 @ (satisjicing-search)@ A FOC$. 
Note that this definition does not exclude the possibility that the search is void in cases 
that the satisficing solution is already at hand. Note also that the definition is using the 
name of search, but is not defining, or describing, the search process itself. Define a 
satisficing goal in terms of a satisficing state: 
Definition 16 (Satisjcing goal). Let G”r$ denote the fact that 4 is a satisficing goal. 
Define: 
As argued above, agents may try to maximize, or even optimize, if the context 
supports the search for extremal values. For example, in production planning, optimal 
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solutions are sought and implemented on a daily basis. Whether a solution is maximal 
or optimal depends, of course, on the structure of the preference order of an agent. If it 
is partial, but not total, the order may contain several maximal, incomparable elements. 
If, furthermore, more than one maximal element is accessible, then an optimal goal (in 
the intuitive sense of a best overall solution) cannot be defined. Conversely, an optimal 
goal can be identified if the order is total and at least one situation is accessible. By the 
same token, a partial order gives rise to an optimal goal if only one maximal situation 
is accessible. We define a “best choice” as a maximal goal and specify the conditions 
under which such a best choice may, in fact, be optimal. 
Definition 17 (Maximal goal). Let Gbc$ denote the fact that 4 is a best choice. 
Define: 
Thus, a best choice is an accessible situation to which no other accessible situation is 
preferred. A best choice 4 is optimal, if 4 is unique: 
Definition 18 (Optimal goal). Let Cop4 denote the fact that 4 is optimal. Define: 
Cop4 a Gbc4 r\‘dt,b( Gbc#) -+ (4 H t,Q)). 
Ironically, best choices need not be good nor satisficing. In a tight spot, an agent’s 
best alternative might simply be the best among dubious alternatives. 
The above definitions can be modified according to the domain. For example, a 
stronger notion of rationality may require that goals be consistent, so that agents will 
not select both 4 and + as goals in the same situation. We did not require consistency 
upfront, because there are many applications of bounded rationality that do allow for 
contradictory goals [ 4 1,421, but consistency can be built into the goal definitions by 
requiring that a goal be, at least, a good goal. Because of the irreflexivity of the P 
operator, good goals are always contradiction-free. Define a consistent satisficing goal 
as follows: 
Definition 19 (Satisjicing Consistent Goal). Let Gsc+ denote the fact that 4 is a sat- 
isficing, consistent goal. Define: 
A consistent best choice can be defined analogously. Optimal goals are always con- 
sistent because they are unique. 
Another reasonable modification of the goal definitions is obtained by imposing the 
requirement of accessibility. Sometimes, goals are pursued even when the agent is 
uncertain whether they are accessible (setting seemingly, but not really, inaccessible 
goals is sometimes hailed as post-modern management style [ 91) . In better-understood 
circumstances, however, accessibility may appear as a reasonable requirement for a 
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goal definition. All goal definitions above can be strengthened accordingly by adding 
the accessibility requirement. Another useful modification is obtained by distinguishing 
between maintenance and achievement goals. Again, it is easy to see how to do this: 
add the goal situation as a conjunct to the definiens of the respective goal definition in 
case of a maintenance goal and add the negation in case of an achievement goal. For 
example, a “good” achievement goal can be defined as follows: 
Definition 20 (Good achievement goal). Let Gg”~ denote the fact that $ is a good 
achievement goal. Define: 
It might go without saying that the definition of extremal goals must always make a 
stipulation about accessibility; otherwise, the sky is the only limit. 
5.2. Using goal definitions: an example 
Although the underlying propositional language imposes obvious limitations on the 
present version of the logic, ALX can already serve as a knowledge-representation tool. 
We demonstrate this by representing Max Weber’s typology of rationality which in- 
formed large parts of twentieth-century sociology [ 16,52,53]. Max Weber distinguishes 
between three “types” of rationality: (1) traditional rationality, (2) value rationality, 
(3) goal rationality. Traditional rationality is circumscribed as a mode of behavior along 
stimulus response patterns. Agents follow the tradition, rather than seeking to improve 
their lives. So, if a situation is a goal, then it remains a goal, regardless of the precon- 
dition. Let G stand for an arbitrary goal; then we can characterize traditional rationality 
by the formula 
The second type of rationality, value rationality, is circumscribed as adherence to preset 
goals that are singled out for their intrinsic value and without regard for possible 
ramifications. We can express this by stipulating that all goals must be good goals and, 
furthermore, that the ramifications of such goals do not count and hence, should not 
appear in the preference order: 
The third type of rationality is circumscribed as the unconditional search for optimal 
solutions (goal rationality). In this rationality mode all goals are, at least, best choices: 
Gc,?I --f Gbc~. 
Weber cautions his readers repeatedly against taking his typology for a complete 
classification. Our formal representation immediately shows, that, in fact, the set of 
building blocks entering the characterizations can give rise to many alternative rationality 
types. Much of the confusion about Weber’s typology would, in fact, go away, if one 
would realize this more clearly. 
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6. Discussion 
ALX provides the skeleton of a preference-driven action logic, based on a proposi- 
tional description language and three types of modal operators, a preference operator, 
an update operator and a set of action modalities. 
6.1. Preferences 
Although preference-based decision making has received some attention in the AI- 
literature [ 8,701, ALX is actually the first preference-based action logic. 
Modal preference logic was introduced by Halldtn [ 171 and codified by von Wright 
[ 72,731, whose preference operator satisfies irreflexivity, transitivity and the conjunction 
expansion principle. We modified his approach by adding normality and making pref- 
erences context-dependent. Our choice of irrejlexivity was made for technical reasons. 
The machinery for reflexive preferences is more complex; also, reflexive preference 
statements are less intuitive (indeed, it is not easy to express reflexive preferences in 
natural language). Transitivity of preferences is widely seen as a basic requirement of 
rational, preference-based decision making and has not been challenged in the basic 
setup of bounded rationality. However, more radical applications of bounded rationality 
have done away with transitivity, claiming that organizational choice is often intransitive 
[42]. ALX can accommodate intransitive preferences since transitivity can be dropped 
without losing completeness and decidability [29]. This non-transitive logic does, in 
fact, allow for intransitive preferences, as the following example shows. Call an ALX 
logic without (TR) ALXFTR. 
Claim 21. There exists an ALX-TR model M = (W, cw, F, Ra, V) and a world w E W 
such that preferences are not transitive, even though the comparison relation t is 
transitive. In particulal; we claim that M, w k (pPq) A (qPr) A -(pPr). 
Proof. Suppose that the set of primitive propositions is {p, q, r}. We define the model 
M = (W, cw, >-, R”, V) as follows: 
w = {wpqr, w/>q, Wpr, Wqr, wp, wq> wr, w0). 
We define cw (to the extent that we need it for the example). 
CW(W,” [P A 1413J = {w,J. 
CW(W,I, 1-p A 4n‘& = {WJ. 
cw(w,,, [is A -rI,> = {wljq}. 
cw(w,, U-s A rDMM) = 1~~~~). 
CWCW,,, IIp A TrIMI = {w,& 
CW(W,,, [I-P A rDMM) = J&+1. 
>-= {(w,,3wq), (wpq3 w/w)). 
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Fig. 2. Counterexample against the transitivity. 
V(P) = {w[Iy’> wpyl W/Y> W,I). 
V(q) = {qq,, wp*, Wyr, wq}. 
V(r) = {W,X,T, W/W, Wyr, w}. 
It is easy to see that the above model M is an ALXpTR model and that M, w,, + 
(pPq) A (qPr) A -(pPr) (see also Fig. 2). 0 
Normality (N) was originally added to ALX in order to achieve completeness. Fur- 
thermore, (N) turns out to be instrumental in blocking counterexamples against the 
conjunction expansion principle. 
The conjunction expansion principle (CEP) itself has always raised eyebrows and 
contributed to preference logic’s unpopularity [49]. We have kept (CEP) for several 
reasons. First, we do not think that (CEP) restricts the logic’s ability to represent 
preferences or preference-related notions, such as goals. At least, we cannot think of 
examples where it makes sense to prefer q5 above i/j but not to prefer &and-not- 
t,G to $-and-not+. Second, we need (CEP) in the construction of context-dependent 
preferences. If the conjunction expansion principle is dropped from the semantics, the 
result is the following interpretation function of the preference operator: 
M, w /I- 4Pf) iff cw(w, U4],> * cw(w, I[&,> 
and on this interpretation function, the following formula becomes valid: 
But this formula is obviously counterintuitive. Third, ALX does not give rise to the 
traditional counterexamples against (CEP) , because (N) blocks these examples. As we 
argue elsewhere [28 3, these examples are based on implicit partiality. For instance, 
assume, as in [4], that it is better that Smith and his wife are happy (p A q), than that 
Smith alone is happy: (pAq) Pp. Conjunction expansion yields (pAqATp)Pl(pAq) Ap 
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and hence the preference for a contradictory state of affairs. This example comes out 
false in ALX because (N) assures that: 
ALX forces the user to make the implication explicit that if Smith is happy alone, 
his wife is not happy: (p A q)P(p A -4). This statement entails no preference for 
a contradictory state of affairs; it is equivalent to its conjunction expansion. Other 
counterexamples to the conjunction expansion principle also exploit implicit partiality 
[ 4,2 1 ] and are blocked in the same way in ALX. 7 
ALX has a situational semantics for preference relations: the agent is supposed to 
hold a preference of 4 above # iff she would prefer &and-not-$ to Q-and-not-4 
under conditions as similar as possible to her actual situation. Obviously, situational 
preferences can be unstable; the agent may hold a specific preference in one situation 
and an opposite preference in another. Although unstable preferences play an important 
role in many applications of bounded rationality [ 3,41,42,5 11, stable preferences might 
still be handy for theoretical purposes (e.g., when using the logic to represent economic 
theories where stability of preferences is often assumed [ IO] >. A stable preference 
relation would be one that does not change from world to world. We have discussed 
stable preferences elsewhere [28]; stability of the preference relation does obtain, for 
example, if a preference depends only on a finite (possibly empty) set of conditions 
that can be expressed as propositions. Stable preferences can be characterized with the 
following axiom: 
ww (NV) 0 x -+ (e-v), 
as shown in [ 281. 
6.2. Minimal change and actions 
Our notion of action is adopted from dynamic logic and its axioms (Al)-(A3) are 
not problematic. It should be clear, however, that this notion of action is, in a sense, 
contemplative: it answers the question of whether a particular 4 is accessible via action 
a (or conversely, what would happen if the agent does a), but it does not answer the 
question of whether the agent will, in fact, do a. 
We have used the notion of minimal change to reflect the context dependency of 
preference statements, but minimal change serves other purposes as well. Stalnaker 
introduced minimal change to modal logic in order to capture the semantics of the 
counterfactual conditionals that reflect causality [38,68]. Our update operator is a 
backward-looking dual to Stalnaker’s conditional, as the “Ramsey rule” shows. 
In our setup, the action operator is not bound to minimal change. Since actions entail 
causal effects, minimal change should appear in the semantics of the action operator 
[ 14,33,7 11. This could address some nastier problems of action logics, in particular the 
quali$cation, frame, and ramiJcation problem. Actions may require a specific context 
’ Contraposition has also been vigorously attacked with similar examples. The similarity is not surprising, 
since (CP) is, in fact, redundant; it follows from (CEP) and (N) as we have proved in Proposition 6. 
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for execution (qualification) that the action description must take into account. Linking 
actions to minimal change can provide an implicit qualification of the context of a 
specific action through the accessibility relation for that action. Using minimal change, 
this context is given by the actual state (that either will or will not permit action a to be 
executed); no additional specification of the context is required, once the accessibility 
relation for action u is given. The frame of change is given by those conditions that do 
not have to change as a function of a’s execution. And the ramifications of an action 
are “automatically” captured by identifying the set of its weakest postconditions. 
ALX does not put strong constraints on the closest world function. Stronger constraints 
might be desirable, perhaps even a full-fledged definition. We have refrained from 
defining the closest world function for ALX for two reasons. First, we wanted to provide 
a “logicians logic”, i.e., a logic whose formal semantics is more than a faithful mirror 
of its syntax. As a consequence, we have used the standard semantic setup without 
strong restrictions on the definition of models and have not given a description of the 
properties of possible worlds. A definition of the closest world function would require 
such a description. Second, we are not sure about the exact meaning of the notion 
of “closest worlds”, despite various attempts in the literature to provide a definition 
[ 14,22,23,33,36,71]. There are two main problems: the definitions do not restrict 
the set of closest worlds as much as intuition seems to require (so the set contains 
more worlds than it should) ; also, the definitions do not clearly distinguish between 
epistemically closest worlds and causally closest worlds. This distinction is required, 
however, because the closest accessible world might very well be further away than the 
closest imaginable world, and this difference is important for an action logic. 
We can illustrate this point by looking at minimal change as a consequence of an 
action. After all, the standard interpretation of actions is in terms of causality, hence 
in terms of minimal change. Unfortunately, there are several ways to conceptualize 
minimal change with respect to actions. We use (a)“4 to denote the set of worlds 
where, by doing action a, the agent can achieve a minimally different &situation. One 
way to conceptualize such a change would be in terms of the closest world accessible 
via action a. Call this kind of “minimal change action” (u)“‘. The corresponding truth 
condition is: 
[(~)“‘47]~ = {w : 3~’ E W(w’ E cw(w, {x : Rawx}) and w’ E [+jM)}. 
According to this truth condition, (u)“‘@ first looks at the closest worlds accessible via 
action a and from this set picks the @worlds (see Fig. 3). 
Consider, as an example, that a denotes the action of “slamming the door” and assume 
that slamming the door will cause the picture to fall off the wall (as opposed to, say, 
“closing the door” that will leave the picture unharmed). Assume 4 stands for the fact 
that the door is shut. (u)“‘+ now looks at a world where the door is shut and the picture 
fell off the wall. 
A second possible definition would approach the minimal change via minimally dif- 
ferent &worlds. Call the corresponding minimal change action (a)“” (see Fig. 4). The 
corresponding truth condition is: 
[(u)“‘~I],,, = {w : 3w’ E W(w’ E cw(w, [qS],) and R’ww’)}. 
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Fig. 3. Minimal change action (a)#‘. 
Fig. 4. Minimal change action (a)#2. 
Reconsider the previous example for (u) #’ Slamming the door would now get us to . 
worlds where the door is shut and the picture is back on the wall. 
Since an additional action is implicit in (u) #2, this kind of minimal change appears less 
intuitive than (u)“‘. But (u) #’ has a drawback as well: (u)#’ will give counterintuitive 
results if the intersection of accessible worlds and 4-worlds is not empty and the 
intersection of the closest u-accessible worlds with the &worlds is. This could happen, 
for example, if slamming the door would not shut the door (say, because of reverberation 
of the door frame). To cover this possibility we might want to look at the closest world 
in the intersection of u-accessible worlds and &worlds. On this view, the minimal 
change action is not going to return the empty set if the intersection of the accessible 
worlds and the closest worlds is not empty. Denote this kind of minimal change by 
(u)#” (see Fig. 5). Th e corresponding truth condition is: 
[(u)“%$], = {w : 3w’ E W(w’ E cw(w,{x : RQwx} n [&f))}. 
But (u)“” cannot be the last word either, because it leaves undecided the question of 
whether the picture is on the wall or not. In sum, we should avoid a full-fledged definition 
of the closest world function until we can decide this-and possibly other-questions. 
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(x Rawx] 
Fig. 5. Minimal change action (a)#3 
6.3. Goals 
Goal is an important primitive notion in other action logics [ 5,6,59], where the 
goal operators act as universal modalities. As a consequence, these logics have the 
necessitation rule for goals (if LY is a theorem, then (Y is a goal) and the closure of 
goals under logical implication (if LY is a goal and LY ---f p is a theorem, then /I must 
be a goal). The necessitation rule and the deductive closure of goals have fairly severe 
counterintuitive implications. For example, if pain is always a consequence of having 
one’s teeth fixed, then the pain itself becomes as a goal. Also, it does not make sense to 
treat tautologies as goals, as the necessitation rule would require. Much recent work in 
action logic has gone into systems that try to avoid these consequences by introducing an 
array of goal-related notions [ $6,591. Unfortunately, these complications bring in other 
or additional counterintuitive effects of goals. For example, in Cohen and Levesque’s 
logic [5,6], it is a theorem that if an agent believes that a fact holds, then the fact 
becomes the agent’s goal. Rao and Georgeff’s paper [59] avoids both necessitation and 
logical closure for certain epistemically qualified goals (agents need not adopt as goals 
what they believe to be inevitably always true and they need not to adopt @ as a goal 
if they believe q5 -+ (CI to be inevitably always true and if they have 4 as a goal). But 
in order to obtain these results, Rao and Georgeff have to make other counterintuitive 
assumptions. For example, they must assume that any believe-accessible world contains 
a goal. ALX can avoid both the necessitation rule and the deductive closure of goals 
by much simpler means, since we need not require monotonicity for the preference 
operator. 
Proposition 22. (i) Goals ( as e ne in this paper) are not closed under logical d ~5 d 
implication, i.e., k (q5 -+ @> does not imply + (G$ + GJI). (ii) Furthermore, goals 
do not sati& the necessitation rule, i.e., b 4 does not imply b Gq5 
Proof. (i) We construct a model M = (K cw, +, Ra, V) for which M k (4 --f $j and 
M /& G+ --f G$ holds. Let W = {wl, w2}, let cw : W x P(W) + P(W) be a function 
that satisfies (CSl>-(CSC). Let %= {({wl},{w2})} and let R” be any set. Define V 
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as follows: V(p) = {wl}, V(q) = {wl,w2} and V(r) = (~2). 
It is easy to see that IIpl, c [qjM, so that M + (p -+ q). On the other hand, we 
have: 
cw(w1, IIp A V-l],) = {wl}, cw(wl, [Y A -pII,) = {w2}, 
CW(W~, [q A 7nM) = {wl}, CW(W~, Or A lqjM) = 0. 
Therefore, 
M, wl //- (pPr) A 7(qPr). 
Hence, 
M, ~1 II- -((M+) ---t (qpr) ). 
Thus the preference operator is not closed under logical implication. As a consequence, 
goals defined in terms of preferences are not closed under logical implication either. 
(ii) We have shown that 
T(TP+) 
is a theorem of ALX, hence the preference operator does not satisfy the necessitation 
rule. 0 
6.4. Decision and planning 
ALX is designed to represent theories about human actions, particularly theories about 
organizations. These theories are usually built around a decision cycle that has an agent 
pondering goals as a function of his problems and his action alternatives [35,54]. 
Planning, as understood in AI, is not a typical problem for such theories, because it is 
primarily a procedural problem: given a goal, find an an optimal sequence of actions 
and find it fast. ALX’s logical properties (completeness, decidability) guarantee that an 
existence proof of an action sequence leading to a particular goal can always be found, 
provided this action sequence is feasible, i.e., a substructure of the accessibility relation 
RU. This may be more than can be said of some other planners. As an example, consider 
the case of conjunctive planning discussed in [43]. 
We have a machine to buy cakes and apples; a cake costs a dollar and an apple three 
quarters. Due to an unfortunate design, the machine only accepts dollars and it returns 
a quarter when the user buys an apple; to alleviate in part this problem, the machine 
can change four quarters into a dollar (see Fig. 6). 
One meaningful planning problem is: Assume a user has five quarters in his pocket: 
can he get a cake and have some change left? We can represent the domain as follows: 
( 1) having-one-dollar + [buying-a-cake] having-a-cake. 
(2) having-one-dollar ----t 
[buying-an-apple] (having-an-apple A having-one-quarter-left). 
(3) having-four-quarters --f [change] having-one-dollar. 
(4) having-five-quarters -+ having-four-quarters A having-one-quarter-left. 
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buy cake buy apple change 
cake quarters 
Fig. 6. A simple conjunctive planning problem 
In the next three assumptions, we exploit the fact that the universal action modality can 
be void: 
(5) having-one-quarter-left 4 [buying-a-cake] having-one-quarter-left. 
(6) having-one-quarter-left -+ [buying-an-apple] having-one-quarter-left. 
(7) having-one-quarter-left -+ [change] having-one-quarter-left. 
(8) having-one-quarter-left 4 having-some-quarter-left. 
The following statement describes the specific situation of the user: 
(9) having-five-quarters. 
The planning problem is whether or not there exists an action sequence that makes the 
following state accessible: 
(having-a-cake A having-some-change-left). 
In proving this state from the premises, we generate the required action sequence: the 
proof is as follows:8 
having-five-quarters (9) 
+ having-four-quarters A having-one-quarter-left (4) 
+ having-one-quarter-left A [change] having-one-dollar (3) 
+ having-one-quarter-left A 
[change] [buying-a-cake] having-a-cake (1, MONA) 
’ In the proof, we use the ALX theorem [a] (4 A $) ++ [ U]C$ A [a]+, which is derivable from ALXS, 
since: 
(4(-dJ v -JI) - (4-4 v (+b (AZ) 
H y(rl)(-d V -$) ++ -((n)-4 V (a)-$) (Meta-reasoning) 
* +l)+& A $) - l(+#J A -l(u)-lc, (Meta-reasoning ) 
* I~~l(4Afi) - lrll4A 1alJl (Definition of [ ] ) 
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=+ [change] having-one-quarter-left A 
[change] [buying-a-cake] having-a-cake (7) 
+ [change] [buying-a-cake] having-one-quarter-left A 
[change] [buying-u-cake] having-a-cake (5, MONA) 
+ [change] [buying-u-cake] having-some-quarter-left A 
[change] [buying-u-cake] having-a-cake (8, MONA) 
* [change] [buying-u-cake] 
(having-some-quarter-left A having-a-cake) 
==+ [change] [buying-u-cake] 
( ALX theorem) 
(having-a-cake A having-some-quarter-left) (SUBA). 
ALX has no machinery for finding plans efficiently. Also, ALX has, in its present 
version, no way of linking actions (or, for that matter, attitudes) to the execution of 
plans; its action modalities are contemplative, so there is no direct way to express that a 
decision or an action has, in fact, occurred. An indirect way to simulate decisions would 
be by defining a necessity operator’ and saying that choosing a particular goal makes 
this goal necessary 
But this expression does not fully capture the intuitive meaning of “decision”. A do/has- 
done operator would be helpful, but such an operator requires a semantic setup that 
includes time explicitly. 
ALX could represent a planning procedure that builds an evaluation gradually as the 
planning process progresses, simply by conditioning preferences on states, so that certain 
states allow for an evaluation whereas others don’t. But, again, this representation would 
not cover the dynamic flavor of a real planning process where “the world out there” acts 
as an oracle and the task is to make this oracle talk and talk fast. 
6.5. Expressive power 
There are still many limitations to ALX’s expressive power. The most important, 
we think, is ALX’s present restriction to a propositional description language; ALX’s 
construction suggests a straightforward extension to first-order logic. A second important 
limitation is due to the absence of a belief operator. We cannot distinguish between 
“objectively” available knowledge and the knowledge available to an individual decision 
maker, so we cannot model the difference between objective and individual knowledge. 
For example, we cannot distinguish between disbelief in inaccessibility and accessibility, 
although this distinction is important when a rational agent is pondering its goals. Third, 
we may need time operators to represent the process of causality or to define a do- 
operator. For example, a time operator would be useful to express a notion of “tradition”, 
or of expectations regarding the future. Last, but not least, we may want to extend ALX 
‘) This can be done as follows: 0~) & -q5 -+ q5 
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to multi-agent acting, by allowing for indexing modal operators with agent terms and 
for quantification over agents and actions. 
We have tried to incorporate important elements of bounded rationality into ALX. 
The basic message of bounded rationality is quite simple: remember the limits of human 
information-processing capacity. Yet it is one thing to recognize the abstract existence 
of these limits and another one to find out where these limits are drawn. In the first 
case, one has to make sure that omniscience claims or omnipotence claims are avoided. 
In the second case, one has to identify which information is processed and how. No 
logic would be able to fully answer the second question, since it is to a large extent an 
empirical one. However, the question does have some general aspects that we did not 
address in this paper. It was not very difficult to transpose the declarative aspects 01 
Simon’s original conceptualization of bounded rationality into an action logic. However, 
its procedural aspects, especially search, may require a completely different semantic 
semantic setup. Incorporating search explicitly in the logic (rather than just naming it, as 
we did in the definition of satisficing states) seems to require introducing “information” 
as a distinct object to the logic. This, in turn, seems to require at least a partial logic; 
perhaps that future work may be able to exploit the progress of situation semantics in 
this area [ 57,581. 
7. Conclusions and future direction 
ALX is the first preference-based action logic. Its basic construction is fairly sim- 
ple: let an agent have context-dependent preferences, give it action alternatives and 
let it deliberate about its actions on the basis of preferences and action alternatives. 
Furthermore, add a notion of causality that reflects the idea of minimal change. The 
context-dependent construction of preferences and the ability to build nested prefer- 
ences gives ALX a strong expressive potential-although realizing this potential will 
require an extension of the logic to a multi-agent setup and to a first-order description 
language. Also, ALX’s basic construction avoids important weaknesses of other action 
and preference logics. For example, goals in ALX need not be closed under logical 
implication, nor are tautologies automatically goals. Furthermore, the infamous conjunc- 
tion expansion principle (CEP) from von Wright’s logic is tamed by normality (N). 
ALX is complete and decidable, which prepares the ground for the development of 
an ALX-theorem prover. Furthermore, its pleasant logical properties would even allow 
for the use of ALX as a planner, albeit an inefficient one. However, ALX’s primary 
task is knowledge representation. Preliminary experiments with a first-order version of 
ALX show that the combination of preference, action and update modalities allows for a 
flexible representation of a variety of theoretical problems in organization theory [ 461. 
Our plan is to build a sequence of more expressive versions of ALX, starting with an 
extension to first-order logic as a description language, then adding multi-agent facilities, 
a belief operator, time operators and (if possible) a “do” operator. Work on ALX will 
continue. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
A. 1, More properties of the preference operator 
Proposition 6 (More properties of the preference operator). The following formulas are 
theorems of ALX: 
(W 4PG * (-$)P(3), 
(IR) -(4P4)7 
(NT) -(TP@),-(+PT), 
(AS) 4P+ --f ,($P$). 
Proof. 
(CP) 4w H (-$)p(+). 
I- WV 
@ I- (4 A ,$,)P($ A -4, (CEP) 
@ I- (-rcI A -(-4>)P(-+~ (+-+))I (SUBP) 
@ k ,*p+ (CW 
(IR) -4#W). 
I- (w$) 
* I- (4 A +)P(~J A -4) (CEP) 
* /-IPI (Definition of J-) 
*i-l (N) 
So t-- ( $Pc$) + 1. Therefore, k -(+P+). 
(NT) 4TP4), -(W-V. 
I- (TP4) 
* I- (+)P(TT) (CP) 
* I- (3)Pl (Definition of T) 
* I- I (N 
So, I- -( TPq5). The proof for the second half of (NT) is similar. 
(AS) 4PQ + $$P4). 
I- (cm+) A (tip+> 
* I- 4p4 Cm) 
=+ j- I (IR) 17 
A.2. Soundness 
Lemma 23 (Soundness of the update axioms). (Ul)-(U6) are valid on the class of 
ALX models. 
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Proof. 
WI) $o$ -*. 
M* w II- + O (I, 
++ 3 E [4],(w E cw( i, [$] M) ) (Truth condition) 
=$ z E u+n,<w E [IAl,) (CSl) 
=+ WE wn, (Meta-reasoning) 
H M, w II- cc, (Definition of II-) 
(U2) $~$-)+oIcI. 
++ M, w /I- 4 and M, w II-- 9 (Truth condition) 
H w E ud4j, and w Eutin, (Definition of /I-) 
+ w E pn, and CW(W [tin,) = {w) (CS2) 
=+ ~W(W E wn, and w E cw (w, [[(cl] M) > (Meta-reasoning) 
H M,wI(-+o$ (Truth condition) 
(U3) -(iO4).-(+oI). 
M,wIj-Io+ 
ti 3i( i E [[_L]lM and w E cw(i, [4],)) (Truth condition) 
+ 3i(i E p-1,) (Meta-reasoning) 
+ False (Meta-reasoning) 
(U4) (+vlCl)oxH(~OX)V(GoX). 
M,wII-(~VG)ox 
H 3i(i E [I~v+~J, and w E cw(i, [Ix],)) 
ej 3i((i E [[4j, and w E CW(~, [I,&,,>> or 









=S 3i(i E [+I, and i E [t&, and w E cw( i, [[tin,) ) (Truth condition) 
=+Lli(i~[+!~],andw=i) (CS2) 
=+ we u+n, (Meta-reasoning) 
+ M, W II- b%, (Definition of I/-) 
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(U6) (4oG) Ax~+o(rcIAx). 
H 3i(i E [+I, and w E cw(i, [I+],,,,)) and w E [[x]~ (Truth condition) 
=+ 3i(i E [[@I, and w E en+, u+n,) n uxn,)) (Meta-reasoning) 
+ 3i(i E [4jj, and w E CW(~, [I$ A xj,) (CS4) 
@ M,w /I- (PO(9AX) (Truth condition) 0 
Lemma 24 (Soundness of the preference axioms). (CEP), (TR), and (N) are valid 
on the class of ALX models. 
Proof. For any ALX model M = (W cw, +, R,, V) and any w E W: 
(CEP) W@ ++ (4 A -ti)P(@ A -4). 
H cw(w, [[4 A -$],,,) + CW(W, [i+ A -+],I (Truth condition) 
H cw(w, ~(4 A -ICI) A 39 A a,) F 
cw(w,u(~~l~) ~~~~~~~~~~~ (Propositional logic) 
H M, w II- (4 A -G)P($ A -4) (Truth condition) 
(TR) (W@) A (tipx) -+ (Wx). 
M>w II- (+P$> A (tipx) 
@ cw(w, [[+ A +nM) k- cw(w, [I@ A -+n,) and 
CW(W, uti A -Xn,> t CW(W uX A -&) (Truth condition) 
+ cw(w, ~4 A -xn,) + CW( W, ux A +)nM) (TRAN) 
@ M,w I/- (Wx) (Truth condition) 
(N) -(J-W),3@~). 
H CW(W, [I A -$I],) + CW(W, [+ A T],) (Truth condition) 
+ cw(w,O) k cw(w, ua,) (Propositional logic) 
+ 0 + cw(~, kg,) (CSl) 
a False (NORM of +) 
The proof about -(qSP_L) goes symmetrically. 0 
Lemma 25 (Soundness of the action axioms). (Al )-( A3) are valid on the class of 
ALX models. 
Proof. For any ALX model M = (W, cw, +, R,, V) and any w E W: 
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(Al) (a)1 c-) I 
M,w II- (4J- 
ej 3z ( RUwz and z E [Il.],) (Truth condition) 
=+ 3z(z E 0) (Meta-reasoning ) 
+ False (Meta-reasoning) 
By propositional logic, I + (a)I_. So (a)l ++ I
(AZ) (a)(4 V $) H (a)4 V (+b. 
H 3~ (R”wz and (z E !+I], or z E [$,I],)) (Truth condition) 
e 3z ( RL’wz and z E [4],) or 3~ ( Rawz and z E [[qb],) (Meta-reasoning) 
@ M, w II- ((44 v (4G) (Truth condition) 
M,w II- (a)($ArCI> 
H 3z(R”wz and z E u4wnM) (Truth condition) 
H 3z( R”wz and z E [Iqbjj, and z E [+j,) (Truth condition) 
+ 2z( R”wz and z E [d$,J and 
3~ (R”wz and z E I)&,& 
H M, w I/- (a)+ and M, w II- (a)$ 
@ M, w II- ((a)4 A k+b> 
(Meta-reasoning) 
(Truth condition) 
(Truth condition) 0 
Lemma 26 (Soundness of the inference rules). (MP), (SUBA), (SUBU) , (SUBP) , 
(NECA) , (MONA) and (MONU) are validity-preserving for the class of ALX models. 
Proof. For any ALX model M = (W, cw, +, RU , V) : 
(MP) I- 4, I- (4 ---t ti) *I- ICI. 
4 and (4 --) t+b) are valid for M 
+ Mw E W( M, w II- 4) and 
~‘wEW(M*WII-(4--,rC/)) (Definition of validity) 
=+ VW E W( M, w )I- 4 and M, w )I-- (4 + $>> (Meta-reasoning) 
* VwE W(M,WII-~A(~+~~~)) (Truth condition) 
=+ VW E W( M, w /I- fi) (Definition of -) 
+ fi is valid for M (Definition of validity) 
(SUBA) I- (4 ++ 4’) =+ ((+J H (+#J’). 
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4 tf 4’ and (u)4 are valid for M 
+ VW E W(M,w II- (4 H 4’)) and 
VW E W(M, W II- (u)4, 
+ VW E W(M, w II- 4 H 4’) and 
(Definition of validity) 
VW E W(3w'~ W)(R’ww’and M,w’#- 4)) (Truth condition) 
+ (VW E W) (3~' E W) (R'ww' and M, w’ I[-- 4’) (Meta-reasoning) 
=+ (VW E W) (M, w II- (a)47 (Truth condition) 
+ (u)4 is valid for M (Definition of validity) 
Therefore, /- 4 ++ 4’ *I- (a)4 -+ (u)4’ is validity-preserving on a model. Sym- 
metrically, we can show that I- 4 H 4’ +I- (u)4’ + (u)4 is validity-preserving. So 
(SUBA) is sound. 
The soundness of (SUMP) and (SUMU) is established in a similar fashion. 
(NECA) I- 4 *I- Lal4. 
4 is valid for M 
=+ (VW E W) (M, w II- 4) (Definition of validity) 
+ (VW E W)('dw' E W)(R'ww' =+ M,w' II- 4) (Meta-reasoning) 
=+ (VW E V(M,w I/- [al4) (Truth condition) 
+ [a]4 is valid for M. (Definition of validity) 
(MONA) I- (a)43 t (4 --f q> +t (u)$. 
(a)4 and 4 + Ic, are valid for M 
+ VW E W(M, w II- (u)4) and U4j, 2 U+bjM (Definition of validity) 
=+ VW E W(3w'(R"ww' and w’ E U4j) and 
~411, c ud, (Truth condition) 
+ VW E W( 3w’( R”ww’ and W’ E [[+jjM) (Meta-reasoning) 
=+ v’w E W(M,w /I- (@k) (Truth condition) 
+ (u)cC, is valid for M (Definition of validity) 
(MONU) i-40x+ (44$,> +tGox. 
4 o ,.y and 4 + $ are valid for M 
+ VW E W(MW II- 40~1 and U4JJM c iit%, (Definition of validity) 
+ VW E W(~W’(W’ E [$j and 
w E CW(W’, [Ix],) and 
u4n c uad (Truth condition) 
=+ VIE ~(3~7~ E u+q, and w E cw(w’, axI,)) (Meta-reasoning) 
+VWE W(M,wII-$0~) (Truth condition) 
d (CI o x is valid for M (Definition of validity) Cl 
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Proposition 7 (Soundness of ALXS) . ALXS is sound. 
Proof. Lemmas A.l-A.4 together imply it. q 
A.3. More properties of the update operator 
Proposition 27 (Update theorems). The following propositions are sound for the class 











ti 3i(i E (IqbJ, and w E cw(i, [4],)) (Truth condition) 
@ WE WI, (CS2) 
@ M, w II- 4 (Definition of )I--) 
(U2”) (409) o+ -qbo$. Firstweprove (+). 
Mtw II- (40@) 0th 
~2 3i(iE I[q50(//], and w E cw(i, /qbJJM,>) (Truth condition) 
* 3i3j(j E @$IM and i E cw(j, [t,b],) and 
w E cw(i, [[@I&) (Truth condition) 
=$ 3i3j(j E [q5], and i E cw(j, [+I,) and w = i) (CS2) 
++ 3j(.i E [$I, and w E cw(j, US],)) (Meta-reasoning) 
H M, w II- 4 0 * (Truth condition) 
Next we prove (+). 
M>W II- (rbo$) 
=+ M,w I/- ($fJo$) A* (U1) 
=j M,w II- (40$) o$ w> 
Therefore, (q5 0 +!I) * (4 0 @) 0 $. 
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uJ3”) -4A (40$) -+ (+A+) OVQ. 
~~,w/I-l~aandM,wII-~ocCr (Truth condition) 
H M, w //- -4 and 3i((i E [qJ],) and w E cw(i, [$],)) (Truth condition) 
Case 1: i E I[-@],. 
=+ 3i(i E [[4], and i E [[-en, and w E cw(i, [?,b,I],>> (Assumption) 
H 3i(i E 14 A +I, and w E cw(L [+l],)) (Truth condition) 
@ M,w II- (4A-G> oti (Truth condition) 
Case 2: i E u$j,. 
in wn, =+i=w (W E cw(41)&) and (CSW 
+ M,W Ij- C$ and M, w II- -4 (in [[@, and M,w II--- -4) 
+ False 
(4r\$) + (40+) is valid 
H -(4 o $) + -q!~ V w+b is valid 
H (-(~o~)v~)-+(~~v~_>V(~(//V_L)isvalid 
~(~ocC,-I)~(~~I)V(~tI)isvalid 
H 3i(i E 141, and w E cw(i, [t+b],,,) and w E [+],) (Truth condition) 
=+ 3i+w (Meta-reasoning) 
Suppose that M, i II- t+b, then 
M,i I(- $ =S CW(~,[[$]~) = {i} + w = i + False. 
Therefore, M, i II f r,b, namely, M, w I/- -$ o I,!J. 
(U6”) (+01cI> A (%o$> + (+o+) A (+o+). 
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(U7” ) (~~9)04~(4~~I)O1cI. 
M>W II- (+A$) 04 
=+ M,w II- ((4AccI) 04) A4 NJ11 
=+ M,w II- (GA41 WI 
=+ M,w/I-($A$)orCI (U2) 
Therefore, (~r\+)o~-+(~#~A~)o~.Theproofabout(~Ar/~)o~+(~r\~)o~ 
goes analogously. 
(US”) ((PA+) 04) ArcI -+ (pAti) 04. 
M, w I/- ((P A 4) 0 4) A ‘t+ 
=+ M,wI/-pA((pA+)o+)AICI (U5) 
=+ M,w II-PA~A$ (Ul) 
=+ M,w II- (PA’/+) 04 (I-Q) 0 
A.4. Completeness 
The completeness proof for ALX proceeds along the lines of a Henkin-style con- 
struction. We give a detailed proof. First, we need a definition of consistency. We say 
that a formula 40 is consistent (with respect to an axiom system) if 1~ is not provable 
(from that axiom system). A finite set (91, . . . , C,Q} is consistent exactly if the formula 
(ol A A (ok is consistent. An infinite set of formulas is consistent if every finite subset 
of it is consistent. A set F of formulas is a maximal consistent set if it is consistent and 
any strict superset is inconsistent. With standard techniques of propositional reasoning 
it can be shown: 
Lemma 28 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). In any axiom system that includes all tautologies 
of propositional logic and the inference rule (MP) : 
( 1) Any consistent set can be extended to a maximal consistent set. 
(2) If F is a maximal consistent set, then for all formulas cp and +k 
(a) either(oEForTcpEF, 
(b) pA@ E F iffqog F and@ E F, 
(c) if q E F and 40 4 Ic, E F, then $ E F, 
(d) if I- p, then 40 E F. 
The completeness of ALX means that: 
(A) For arbitrary formula set A and arbitrary formula $, A k 4 + A I-ALX 4. 
It actually turns out to be easier to show the following statement: 
(B) For arbitrary formula set A, A is consistent with ALX # A has an ALX model. 
We show that (A) and (B) are equivalent: 
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Proof. 
(B) * (A). 
+ A U {-#J} is consistent with ALX 
+ A U (-4) has an ALX model 
=+ 3M E Mod(M b A and M + -4) 
+ 3M E Mod( M k A and M p 4) 
+ It is not the case that 
tlM E Mod( M + A + M + q5) 
*Al++ 
(Definition of consistency) 
(B) 
(Definition of b) 
(Truth condition) 
(Meta-reasoning) 
(Definition of b) . 
(A) =+ (B). 
A has no ALX model 
=+ 1(3M~Mod(M+d)) (Definition of b) 
+ b’M E Mod( M k A) (Meta-reasoning) 
+ YM E Mod( M F A or M k I) (Meta-reasoning) 
+ VM E Mod( M j= A =+ M k I) (Meta-reasoning) 
*A+1 (Definition of k) 
* A I-&x -l (A) 
+ A is inconsistent with ALX (Definition of consistency) El 
Assume that we can construct a canonical model M, where the possible worlds are 
maximal consistent sets, then, in order to show the completeness, we have to show that 
for any formula 4, 
(1) 4E w@wE [4],,9 
(2) M, is an ALX model. 
So our task is to construct a canonical model that is an ALX model. First, we need two 
lemmas (for the action and the update operators, respectively) that ensure the existence 
of certain maximal consistent sets required in the construction of the canonical model. 
Let IV, be the set of all maximal consistent sets built from the elements of FML. 
Lemma 29 (Action Lemma). 
V’w E WC((U)4 E w + (32 E WC)($ E z and (V$ E z)((a)@ E w))). 
Proof. Suppose that (a)$ E w and let F = {qb} U {(cl : -(u)-Ic, E w}. Let w* = {1+4 : 
-(u)-lc, E w}. 
We show first that ( 1) w* and (2) F are consistent. We then show (3) that we can 
always extend F to an F’ such that F’ satisfies the condition of the lemma, i.e. F’ = z. 
(1) We claim that w* is consistent. This is implied by: 
( 1.1) Assume that I E w* we then show that _L E w* -+ False. 
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I E w* 
=+ +z)d E w (Definition of w*) 
=+ +)T E w (Propositional logic) 
* ?(a)T A (a)4 E w (Assumption) 
=+ +)T A (a)T E w (MONA) 
3 False (Maximal consistency of w) 
(1.2) We show that &,+z E w* + (~$1 A 42) E w*. 
+ -(a)-& E w and -(a)~& E w (Definition of w*) 
==+ -(@)-#J1 v (4742) E W (Propositional logic) 
* -((a)(+1 v 352)) E w (AZ) 
=+ 3++(41 A42)) E w (Propositional logic) 
=+ #I A42 E w* (Definition of w* ) 
( 1.3) For arbitrary $, we must show that I,+ E w*,+ E w* =S False. 
*EW*,+EW* 
=+ (t/b A-t/b> E w* (1.2) 
*IEw* (Propositional logic) 
+ False (1.1) 
We conclude that w* is consistent. 
(2) We claim that F is consistent. This is implied by: (2.1) C$ + I + False and 
(2.2) for any + E w*,+ A@ + l_ + False. 
(2.1) Assume that 4 --t I, then: 
4--l 
+ (u)i E w ((a)4 E w and (MONA)) 
=+_LEW (AlI 
+ False (Maximal consistency of w) 
(2.2) For arbitrary $ E w*, assume that 4 A Ic, -+ 1. We show that C/J A t+b + i =s 
False. 
Y3AcC,--tJ- 
=+ (4 + 3) (Propositional logic) 
=+ (4 + +) and $ E w* and (a)4 E w (Assumption) 
==+ (4 -+ -$) and T(U)-Ic, E w and (u)4 E w (Definition of w* ) 
=+ -(u)-1/1 E w and (u)-$ E w (MONA) 
+ False (Maximal consistency of w) 
We conclude that F is consistent. 
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We show now that any maximal extension F’ of F satisfies the lemma. So, let F’ be 
an arbitrary maximal consistent extension of F. We must show that: (3.1) F’ exists, 
(3.2) 4 E F’, (3.3) (a)+4 # w + cc/ @ F’. 
(3.1) Straightforward from Lindenbaum’s Lemma. 
(3.2) From the definition of F’. 
(3.3) We have: 
(a)+ @ w 
* -(a)@ E w (Maximal consistency of w) 
=+ +I)-+ E w (Propositional logic) 
* -+ E w* (Definition of w*) 
==ST$bEF (Definition of F) 
=+ + E F’ (Definition of F’) 
=+G,F’ (Maximal consistency of F') . 0 
The next lemma parallels the Action Lemma for the update operator. 
Lemma 30 (Update Lemma). 
VWE W,(~OXEW+ (3 EW,)(~EZ and (V$EZ)($OXE~))). 
Proof. Suppose that 4 o x E w. Let 
F={4}U{$:~(+ox) EW}, w” = {(c, : 7(ll+b 0 /y) E w}. 
The proof’s geometry parallels the Action Lemma. We show first that (1) w” and (2) 
F are consistent. We then show (3) that we can always extend F to an F’ such that F’ 
satisfies the condition of the lemma, i.e. F’ = z. 
( 1) We claim that w” is consistent. 
( 1.1) Assume that _L E w’, then we can show that I E w” + False. 
i E w” 
=+ -(do/y) E w (Definition of w” ) 
=+ ~(To,y) E w (Propositional logic) 
+ l(To,y) A (40~) E w (Assumption) 
+ -(To,y)~(Tox) EW (MONU) 
+ False (Maximal consistency of w) 
(1.2) We show that 41,42 E w” + (41 A42) E w”. 
+ ~(T$I o ,y) E w and ~(142 o x) E w (Definition of w”) 
=+ ~(741 oxV~42ox) E w (Maximal consistency of w) 
=+ -((741 vl42) ox) E w (U4) 
=+ l(-(41 A42) OX) E W (Propositional logic) 
=+ 41 A42 E w” (Definition of w”) 
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(1.3) For arbitrary 1+4, we must show that Cc, E wO,-+ E w0 3 False. 
cc, E w”,+ E w” 
=+ (9 A -*) E w” (1.2) 
=%iEWO (Propositional logic) 
+ False (1.1) 
We conclude that w” is consistent. 
(2) We claim that F is consistent. This is implied by: (2.1) 4 + _L + False and 
(2.2) For any + E w”,q4 AI/J -+ I + False. 




+ False (Maximal consistency of w) 




+ (Q,--@) andcC,Ew’and@oxEw 
+ (4--q?) and-+oxEwand4oxEw 
=+ (-@ox) E wand (+0x> E w 
+ False 
We show that 4 A 1+4 + I + 
(Propositional logic) 
(Assumption) 
(Definition of w”) 
(MONU) 
(Maximal consistency of w) 
We conclude that F is consistent. We now show that any arbitrary maximal extension 
F’ of F satisfies the lemma. So, let F’ be an arbitrary maximal consistent extensions of 
F. We must show that: (3.1) F’ exists, (3.2) q!~ E F’, (3.3) fi ox # w + @ # F’. 
(3.1) Straightforward from Lindenbaum‘s Lemma. 
(3.2) From the definition of F’. 
(3.3) We show that as follows: 
@ox$w 
=+ -(@ox) E w (Maximal consistency of w) 
=+ -(--r/Q 0 x) E w (Maximal consistency of w) 
* -* E w0 (Definition of w’) 
*+EF (Definition of F) 
=+ -@ E F’ (Definition of F’) 
**#F’ (Maximal consistency of F') . 0 
Proposition 8 (Completeness of ALXS) . ALXS is complete for the class of ALX models. 
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Proof. We construct a canonical model h4, = (IV,, cw, Ra, t-, V) and show that: 
( 1) Truth Lemma: x E w E WC ti w E [xjMC. 
(2) M, is an ALX model. 
Define M, = (WC, cw, Ra, +, V) as follows: 
WC = {i : i is a maximal consistent set}, 
w E cw(j, {w’ : Ic, E w’}) iff V’p(p E j * poq E w), 
(w,x) E R” iff Vp(p E x + (a)p E w), 
cw(w, {w’ : C$J A + E w’}) * cw(w, {w’ : 1# A + E w’}) iff c$P$ E w, 
V(pi) = {W 1 pi E W}. 
We prove the Truth Lemma by induction on the complexity of x. 
(1.1) XEpi. 
Pi E W 
H w E V(Pi) (Definition of V) 
* w E UPilbf, (Truth condition) 
( 1.2) x S -4. 
-4 E w 
@4@w (Maximal consistency of w) 
* wGU& (Induction hypothesis) 
* w E [I-&, (Truth condition) 
(1.3) x-Cpr\$. 
+r\tiew 
@ &@ Ew (Maximal consistency of w) 
H w E [+] M, and w E [q],, (Induction hypothesis) 
++ we u4wnMc (Truth condition) 
(1.4) x EE (a)C$. 
(+P E w 
~32~W,(~,~andV~~~((a)~Ew)) (ActionLemma) 
+ 3z(q5 E z and R’wz) (Definition of R”) 
a ~Z(Z E [+],, and Pwz) (Induction hypothesis) 
+ w E wnM, (Truth condition) 
w 6 uwnMc x=+ 3~ E W,( Rawz and z E [[+jM,) (Truth condition) 
H 3z E Wc(Rawz and q5 E z) (Induction hypothesis) 
=+ (+$ E w (Definition of R’) 
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(1.5) ,yr(tJo*. 
+ 3z(+ E z and (V,pE z)((po+) E w)) (Update lemma) 
+ 3z (4 E z and w E cw( z, {w’ : Cc, E w’}) > (Definition of cw) 
=+ 3z(z E [4],,,, and w E c~(z,U$]~,)) (Induction hypothesis) 
=+ w E iI+&, (Truth condition) 
w E II+&, 
H ~Z(Z E u+n,, and w~c~(~,ullrn,,)) (Truth condition) 
++ 32 (4 E z and w E cw( z, {w’ : t,b E w’}) ) (Induction hypothesis) 
*qbo$bEw (Definition of cw) 
(1.6) x = qhPt,b. 
‘3 cw(w,{w':c$ A-@ E w'}) + 
cw(w,{w’ :Ic, A 14 E w'}) (Definition of +) 
H CW(~, {w’ : 4 E w’} n {w' : -* E w’}) >- 
cw(w, {w’ : $ E w’} n {w’ : -Cp E w’}) (Meta-reasoning) 
H cw(w, wn,, n u-a,) + 
~wban,,ab45n~~~ (Induction hypothesis) 
H CW(W, [I+ A -t,b],,) + CW(W, [(c, A +jM,) (Truth condition) 
++ w E uevnM, (Truth condition) 
This concludes the proof of the Truth Lemma. We now show that M, is an ALX model. 
So, we have to show that cw satisfies (CSl), (CS2), and (CSC). Moreover, we have 
to show that + satisfies the transitivity and normality conditions. 
(csl) w E 4j9 w,,) + WE wh,. 
‘++~'p(pEj*potiEw) (Definition of cw) 
+ 3p( p E j and p o $ E w) (j is not an empty set) 
*$C,Ew (Ul) 
w w E ud,, (Truth Lemma) 
(CS2) j E [t,blM, + cw(j, [+],,) = {j}. We must show that: (a) j E [@],, + j E 
~w(.i,[$],,L and (b) j E UIcIIM, andj'E 4_LU&,,,> *j =j'. 
For (a), we have: 
j E wn,, 
@*cEj (Truth Lemma) 
+ b”p( p E j + (p A $> E j) (Maximal consistency of j) 
=+ vp(pEj* (PO@) Ej) (U2) 
=+ j E cw(j, wn,,) (Definition of cw) . 
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For (b), suppose that j E [+], and j’ E cw(j, [(c/],), we first show that j C j’. 
Then by the maximal consistency of both j and j’, we have j = j’. To show that j C j’, 
we proceed by reductio ad absurdum and show that p E j and p $ j’ ==+- False for 
arbitrary p. 
p E j and p # j’ 
H p E j and up E j’ (Maximal consistency of j’) 
+pA$~jandlp~j’ (j E [+,D and maximal consistency of j) 
+ ( (p A 9) o @) E j’ and up E j’ (j’ E cw( j, [@_DMC) and definition of cw) 
* ((PA$) o$) Ej’ and 
~((PAvQ) o$) Ej’ (U5) 
+ False (Maximal consistency of j’) 
w.3 ~~hu+n,~) n uen, c c~WWWI,~. For my j E ~~wJl4n,~~ n u@n ,,,,,we have to show that j E cw( w, [q5 A +I,,). That is, for any p, if p E w, then 
p o (4 A I+/?> E j by the definition of cw. 
For any p: 
p~wandjtcwtw,[I~a,~)nu~n,~ 
+ p E w and j E cw(w, [q3],,) and il/ E j (Truth Lemma) 
=+po4~jand@~j (Definition of cw) 
=$ (po4)ArC,Ej (Consistency of w) 
* PO($A$) t.i W6). 
Therefore, j E cw( w, [I+ A t&,,, ) by the definition of cw, so (CSC) holds. 
(NORM) (8 $ X). We must show that 8 > X + False. 
0b-x 
+ 3w3@~+4(+6P+ E w and 
cw(w, 114 A -fin,,) = 0 and 
cw(w, [Ifi ~-&,c) =X and 
cwbmA -fin,,) +
w4M~~4n~,)) (Definition of +) 
=+ cw(w, UQ”f, f + cw(w, U$ A -#II& (cw(w,[&) =0 by (CSf)) 
+ cw( w, [II A -(q A -a,,) + 
cw(w,uWhb) A71nMc) (Meta-reasoning) 
+ .lP($ A -4) E w (Definition of cw) 
+ False WI 
(TRAN) CW(W,X~~) + CW(W,Y nX) and cw(w,Y nz> F cw(w,Z nL) + 
CW(W,Xnz) k cw(w,znX). 
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cw(w,Xnr> + cw(w,Ytlx) and 
cw(w,YflZ) * cw(w,Z nr> 
+ 3@,Glx(~$Pa+b E wand @PXE w and 
[@Ii M, = X and UlclII,, = Y and UxilMM, = Z) (Definition of +) 
+ &!A+b3~(c,bP,y~ w and t+$P,y~ w and 
UC&,, =X and lIdI,, = Y and UxllMc = Z) (TR) 
=+ 3&l@ 
X(cW(W, 114 A 7X],,,,) % X(cW(W, I[X A 7$],,) and 
U41 M, = X and [I+ll MC = Y and UxIIM, = Z) (Definition of + ) 
=+ CW(W,X~Z) s- CW(W,Z~X) (Meta-reasoning) 
This concludes the proof that M, is an ALX model. 0 
A.S. The finite model property of ALX 
Definition 31 (Subfomzula set). A formula set @, is said to be the subformula set of 
p iff QP satisfies the following conditions: 
l PEG,, 
Claim 32. For any formula p, the subformula set of p is closed under subformulas. 
In ALX, the truth condition of g3P1+? depends on the conjunction expansion prin- 
ciple cw( w, [[+ A -$I,) t cw(w, [II, A -c$],). Because of this, we shall need an 
extended subformula set to handle the problem. We define the extended subformula set 
accordingly. 
Definition 33 (Extended subformula set). Let @ be a formula set which is closed under 
subformulas. The extended subformula set @++ is defined as the Boolean closure of @. 
Let @+ be the set of single representatives for each propositional equivalence class of 
the formulas in @++. In particular, we have @ 2 @. 
It is easy to see that @+ is finite, since @ is finite. Moreover, for any $, @ E @‘+, there 
exist formulas Xt,chi~ E @‘such that I- (Xi t--f (~$r\-+)) and /- (X2 H (e/\-4)). 
In particular, we have _L E @+. 
Definition 34 (Equivalence relation on possible worlds). Let M be an ALX model 
(W, >-, cw, R’, V) and @ be a formula set which is closed under subformulas. For any 
w, ~1’ E W, we define 
w x w’ with respect to M and 0’ iff Yp E @+( M, w II-- p # M, w’ I/- p). 
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Definition 35 (Equivalence class) _ Let z be an equivalence relation on possible worlds 
with respect to M and @+ and w be a possible world, we define 
[w] S{W’E w: w z w’ 1. 
Definition 36 (Filtration). A filtration of M = (W, Y-, cw, Ra, V) through @’ is any 
model M* = (W”, +*,cw*, R”*, V”) which satisfies the following conditions: 
( 1) W* is a subset of W which consists of exactly one world from each equivalence 
class. 
(2) R“*, cw*, +* satisfy the following suitability conditions: 
(~.~)VW,W’E W*((%E W)(Rawuandw’~:) +R’*ww’), 
(2.2) VW, w’ E w* 
(R”*ww’ =S (Y(a)4 E @+) (M, w’ II- 4 + M, w II- (a)+)), 
(2.3) VW, w’ E W* 
((V$E@+)((~UE W)(WECW(U,[@]~) andw’xu) + 
w-w*(w’,[$]~*))) 
(2.4) VW, w’ E W* 
((V$ E @,‘) 
(w E CW*(w’, [[$I],*> =+ 
(Q E @+) 
((M,w’II-~AIC,~M,wlI-(~A~)orCI) and 
(M,~‘II-~A~~~M,wII-(~A~~,)~~) and 
(M,w’ Ii- (-#A@) * M,w II_ (-#A+> o(cI) and 
(M,w’ /I- (+A+) + M,w II- (+A+> o(cI>>>)* 
(2.5) Vw,E w*(vC#l,+ E CD+> 
(cw*(w, [I4 A ~!4ql~* > )-* cw*(w,[-4ArcI],,J H M,w II- (+p$)). 
(3) V*(pi) = V(pi) for any pi E @+. 
Theorem 37 (Filtration Theorem). Let M = (W, +, cw, R’, V) be any ALX model, @ be 
any formula set which is closed under subformulas and M* = (W”, +*, cw*, R”*, V’) 
be any filtration of M through @+, then for any x E Qpf and any w E W* (M, w II- 
x @ M*,w I)- x). 
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the complexity of @+. For any x E @: 
(1) /YEPi. 
M, w II- pi 
@ w E V(E) (Truth condition) 
H w E V*(pi) (Definition of V*) 
++ M*, w (I- pi (Truth condition) 
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(2) x G -4. We know that 4 E @+, 
M, w I/- 14 
@ M, w I\$+ (Truth condition) 
@ M*,w iI++ (Induction hypothesis) 
H M*, w I/- -4 (Truth condition) 
(3) x = 4 A 9. We know that 4, I+G E Qp+, 
M>w II-+ Ail, 
++ M, w /I- (b and M, w II- (I, (Truth condition) 
H M*, w I/- 4 and M*, w II- q+ (Induction hypothesis) 
@ M*,w II- 4AlcI (Truth condition) 
(4) x E (LZ)~. We know that 4 E @+, 
M, w II- (a>+ 
+ 3~ E W( Rawu and M, u II-- 4) (Truth condition) 
+ 3w’ E W* (R“wu and w’ z u and M, u II- qb) (Definition of W*) 
+ 3w’ E W*( R’wu and w’ M u and M, w’ II- 4) (Definition of E) 
=S 3w’ E W* (R”*ww’ and M, w’ /(- 4) (2.1) 
+ Zlw’ E W*(RU*ww’ and M*, w’ II- qS> (Induction hypothesis) 
* M*, w II- (a)$ (Truth condition) 
M*,w II- (a)+ 
H 3w’ E W* (R”* ww’ and w’ E [q!~],* ) (Truth condition) 
u 3w’ E W* ( R’*ww’ and w’ E [c$],) (Induction hypothesis) 
11s 
=+ M> w /I- (a)4 (2.2) 
(5) XEC$O@. Weknowthatd,+ E@+, 
* 3u(M, u I/- 4 and w E cw(u, [$,I],)) 
+ 3w’ E W*(M,u I\- C/J and w’ M u and 
w E cw(uv Ulcl],)) 
=+ 3~’ E W*(M,w’ II- c,A and w E CW(U,[I&,)> 
+ ~W’E W*(M,w’II-4andw~cw*(w’,(I$],,)) 
+ 3~’ E W*(M*,w’ )I- #J and w E cw*(w’,[&,.)) 
=+ M*,w II- 40$ 
M*,w II- 401c, 
w 3~’ E W*(M*,w’ II- C$ and w E cw*(w’,[t,bJjM,)) 
@ 3~’ E W*(M,w’ I)- C$ and w E cw*(w’,[@],.)) 
(Truth condition) 
(Definition of W* ) 
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Case 1: M, w’ II- +. 
M, w’ II- + and M,w’ II- 4 and w E cw*(w’, [fi],.)) 
+ M,w’ //- (&A$) and WE cw*(w’,~t,b],~>> (Truth condition) 
=+ M,wII-(+A$)ocC, (2.4) 
=+ M,wII-4orCI (MONU) 
Case 2: M, w’ II- -I@. 
M, w’ I/- -$ and M, w’ II- 4 and w E cw*(w’, [+l),*)) 
=+ M,w’II-(+A(-#)) andwEcw*(w’,[~],,,*)) (Truth condition) 
=+ M,w II- (4A (+))o@ (2.4) 
=+ M,w II-+o$ (MONIJ) 
(6) x E #Pg. We know that #,$ f Gp+, 
H cw*(w, ~4 A +n,) +* cw*(w, u(cl A-4n,.) (2.5) 
H M*,w II- w* (Truth condition) 
For any x such that x E @+ but x # @, we know the following facts: 
(7) x E -4 and 4 E @. So 4 E @+. 
M, w /I- -4 
@ M, w Ilf 4 (Truth condition) 
@ M*,w II+4 (Induction hypothesis) 
H M* , w II- -4 (Truth condition) 
(8) x-$A$ and4,@ E@. 
M,wIl+4AcC, 
H M, w II- 4 and M, w I/- @ (Truth condition) 
w M”, w )I- (b and M*, w /I- $J (Induction hypothesis) 
* M*,w II- tir\ti (Truth condition) 
Therefore, for any x E @+, we have M, w II- x H M”, w II- x. 0 
Corollary 38 (Filtration Corollary). Let M = (W +, cw, RU, V) be any ALX model, @ 
be any formula set which is closed under subformulas and M* = (W* , %* , cw*, Ra’, V”) 
be any filtration of M through Qi+, then for any 4, cc/ E @+ and w E W*: 
(a) M, w /I- -4 @ M’, w II- -4, 
(b) M, w II- 4 A $ @ M*, w II- 4 A 9, 
(c) M, w /I- qf~ A -$ ti M”, w II- q!~ A -@. 
Proof. Straightforward. 0 
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Theorem 39 (Invalidity Theorem). Suppose that a formula x is invalid in a model M, 
then x is invalid in every jiltration of M through @s. 
Proof. Since x is invalid in a model M = (W +, cw, R’, V), there is some w E W 
such that M, w (/- 1~. Suppose that M* = (W”, cw*, F*, R”*, V’) is a filtration of M 
through @s. By the definition of W*, there is some w* E W’ such that w z w* with 
respect to M and @s. Obviously, x E QX, + therefore M, w* II-- TX. By Corollary 38(a), 
M*, w* II- TX and so x is invalid in M*. 0 
Theorem 10. ALX has the jinite model property 
Proof. For arbitrary x, suppose that [fALx x, then there exists a model M = (W, + 
, cw, R”, V) and a world w E W such that M, w iI+ x. Let QX be the subformula set of 
x. We know that 0, is finite. Moreover, @i also is finite, by the definition of @s. 
Now, we construct a filtration M* = (W”, +-*, cw*, Ra*, V”) of M through @s as 
follows: 
( 1) For W*, we first construct the equivalence class [ ] on W as: 
[w] &%{w’: V’~E~~X+~W’EW(M,W~~-~~M,W’~)-~)}. 
From each class [w], we select exactly one world w’ E [w] to represent this class. 
Now let W* be the set of all representing worlds. 
From the definition of the equivalence class [ 1, we know that for any class [ wl ] and 
any class [ ~21, if [ wl] f [ ~21, then there exists p E @i such that either M, wl II- p 
and M, ~2 I]+ P, or M, wl I]$ p and M, w2 II- p. Because @$ is finite, there are only 
finitely many formulas p by which we can distinguish two different classes. Therefore, 
there are only finitely many equivalence classes, namely, at most 2CXd’@:‘. So W” is 
finite. 
(2) For V*, we define 
V*(pi) 2% V(p;) if pi E @i. 
(3) For R”*, we define that, for any w, w’ E W*, 
(w, w’) E R“* iff (V(a)+ E @px’) (M, w’ II- 4 * M,w II- (a)+). 
(4) For cw*, we define that, for any w, w’ E W* and any $ E @f, 
w E cw* (w’, [$I M* > iff 
((~~E~~)((M,w’II-~A~~M,~II-M,~()-(~A~CI)~~) and 
(M, w’ II- 4 A + + M, w II- (4 A -9) 0 $) and 
(M,w’ II- (-$A@) * M,w II- (+A+) oti) and 
(M,w’ II- (-+A+) =+ M,w II- (+A-$) 09))). 
(5) For +*, we define that, for any w E W* and any $,fl E @i, 
cw* ( w, [i+ A -Iclj,* ) +* cw* ( w, [I-$ A (cl] M* ) iff M, w )I- $P@. 
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Now, we have to show that M* satisfies the conditions of a filtration of M through 
@s. From the construction of W*, we know that W* is a subset of W. Moreover, W* 
consists of exactly one world from each equivalence class with respect to M and @z. 
Therefore, the condition for W* is satisfied. 
From the above definition of V*, Ra*, cw*, %-*, the suitability conditions (2.2)) (2.4), 
(2.5) of Definition 36 and the condition for V* are obviously satisfied. 
To show that (2.1) is satisfied, we have to show that 
VW, w’ E W*(3u E W)(w’ x u and R’wu)) 3 Ra*ww’). 
Suppose that 3u E W(w’ M u and Rawu) and for any (a)~$ E @i: 
(u)4 E @px’ and M, w’ II- 4 and R”wu 
=s (u)#J E @i and M,u )I-- qb and R”wu (Definition of z) 
+ (cz)~ E @s and M, w I/- (u)+ (Truth condition) 
Therefore, according to the definition of R”“, we have Ra*ww’, so (2.1) holds. 
To show that (2.3) is satisfied, we have to show that 
For any w, w’ E W* and any Ic, E @i, suppose that 
(3~ E W)(w’ M u and w E cw(u, [I+jM)) 
and for any #I E @i: 
(1) Assume that M, w’ II- (4 A t,!~), then: 
M,w’ II- (4/1~,4) and w’ = u and w E cw(u, [$I,> 
=+ M,u II- (4 A$) and w E CW(U, wn,) (Definition of =) 
=+ M, w /I- (4 A G) 0 9) (Truth condition) 
(2) Assume that M, w’ /I- (4 A -$), then: 
M, w’ II- (4 A +) and w’ E u and w E cw(u, [$],> 
+ M,u /I- (4 A +) and w E cw(u, [$I,) (Definition of C) 
=+ M,w (I- ($A+) oti) (Truth condition) 
(3) Assume that M, w’ II- (-4 A 4)) then: 
M,w’II-(+A$) and~‘zuaandwEcw(u,[I$]~) 
=+ M,u I/- (14 A @) and w E cw(u, [fin,) (Definition of z) 
=+ M,w II- (+r\+) occI> (Truth condition) 
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(4) Assume that M, w’ II- (-4 A -$), then: 
M, w’ II- (-4 A -$) and w’ x u and w E cw(u, [I@],) 
3 M,u /I- (-4 A +) and w E cw(u, [@I],) (Definition of z) 
=+ M, w I/- (-4 A 19) 0 $) (Truth condition) 
Therefore, according to the definition of cw* above, we have w E cw* (w’, ([(cl] Me ) . So 
(2.3) holds. 
We know now that M* is indeed a filtration of M through IPf . Moreover, we know 
that M” is a finite model. By the above theorem, we know that there exists a w E W’ 
such that M*, w IIf x. Therefore, condition (1) of the finite model property (Definition 
9) is satisfied. 
In order to show that condition (2) of the finite model property is also satisfied, we 
have to show that M* is an ALX model. That is to say, we have to show that cw* 
satisfies (CS 1) -( CSC) and +* satisfies the transitivity and the normality. 
For any w, w’ E W* and any Cc, E @i, 
(CSI) w E cww,u~~,.) + w E itin,*. 
w E cw*(wI, wn,.) 
@ (3 Eql) 
((M,w’ II- (+A$) * M,w II- (+A$) o+) and 
(M,w’ I/- (4A3) =+ M,w /I- (+A$) oQ) and 
(M,w’ II- (-$A$) * M,w II- (+A@) o+) and 
(M, w’ /I- (+ A -fi) + M, w II- (-4 A -$) o fi)) (Definition of cw*) 
Case 1: M,w’ II-- (4r\+). 
M, w’ \I- (4 A @) 
+ M, w II- (c$ A$) o+ (Definition of cw*) 
=+ M, w II- Ic, (M is an ALX model and (Ul)) 
=+ M*,w II- 9 (Filtration Theorem) 
+ w E wn,. (Definition of [I I] ,,,,. ) 
The other cases (4 A -yi, lq5 A 1+4, -q5 A -3) are proved similarly. Therefore, (CSI) is 
satisfied. 
(CS2) w E [[$I] M* + CW* ( W, I[+1 Ms ) = {w}. We must show that: 
(a) w E utinrcI* =+ w E cw*(w, u+n,.), 
(b) WE [I$],,,* and W’ E cw*(w, [I$],.> + w E w’, 
where w E w’ means that w and w’ represent the same equivalence class with respect 
to M* and @$, namely, 
~‘p~cD,f(M*,wI/-p~M*,w)I-p). 
For (a), we will show that w E [I$] M* and w $Z cw* (w, [ql] M* ) + False. 
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w E iId,,,* and w # cw*tw, [v+],,,*> 
* w E [IdI, and w 6 cw*(w, [$I],,,*) (Filtration Theorem) 
* w E u+n, and (34 E @f) 
((MYwli-(4ArcI) andM,wll+(4~$)0$) 
or (M, w I/- (4 A -+) and 
M?wIlf(4A+)oJI) 
or CM, w I/- (lq5 A 1+9) and 
M,w llf(-4AcCI) occI> 
or (M,w )I-- (l+r\-@) and 
M, w llf (-+ A -rcI) 0 G> (Definition of cw* ) 
* w E II+], and (34 E a,‘) 
((M,w II- (4~9) and M,w II$(~JA~> 09) 
or (M,w II- (+I and M,w llf (4 A ~$1 oq) 
or (M,w I]- -v$Afi and 
M,w lif(+ArCI) o$) 
or (M,w II-- (-fi> and 
MT w I/$ (-4 A -9) 0 ‘4) (MONU) 
* w E [[$I,,, and (34 E @;> 
((M,w II- (@ArCI) and M,w ll$t$ArcI) o+) 
or (M,wll- (-4 A(b) and 
M,~~II$(+A$) o$) (Meta-reasoning) 
=S 34 E @5x’ 
((M,w II- ((4 A$) A$) and 
M,wII$($A9)0@) 
or (M,w I/- ((-+A$+) A+) and 
M,w lif(+A$) oIcI> 
=+ $5 E@Px+ 
CM, w II- ti, 
and Truth condition) 
((~,wII- ((+A$) o@) and 
M?wIl$(4A@)o$) 
or (M,w /I- ((+A@) o+) and 
M,w II$(-$A$) 0’4) 
+ False 
(M is an ALX model, 
and (U2)) 
For (b), suppose that w E @I],,,,* and w’ E cw*(w,[(//],,), for any 4 E @i, we 
have to show that 
M*,w I/- p H M*,w' II- p. 
Z Huang et ul. /Art@cial Intelligence 82 (1996) 75-127 
(=+) We show that M*, w II- p and M*, w’ II$ p + False. 
121 
M*, w /I- p and M*, w’ I\$ p 
=+ M, w II- p and M*, w’ Ilf p (Filtration Theorem) 
+ M, w /I- p and M*, w’ /(- up (Truth condition) 
+ M, w I(- p and M, w’ II- up (Filtration Corollary (a) ) 
=+ M,w /I- pand M,w’II- ~((pAt,b) ot+b) (M is anALXmode1 and (U5)) 
=+ M,w /I- (PA+) and 
M,w’ II- -((PA@) oCCI) (w E U&4*) 
+ M,w’ I\- (PA@) o1,4 and 
M,w’II--((~Afi)oglr) (Definition of cw* ) 
=+ False 
(x==) We show that M*, w’ I(- p and M*, w IIj p + False. 
M*,w’ 11-p and M*,w llfp 
=+ M, w’ I/- p and M*, w IIf p 
+ M, w’ (I- p and M*, w /I- up 
+ M, w’ /I- p and M, w II- up 
+ M, w’ II- p and M”, w II- qb and M, w II- up 
+ M, w’ /I- p and M, w II- t,G and M, w II- up 
3 M, w’ II- p and M, w (I- (-p A 1+9) 
+ M, w’ I/- p and M, w’ II- (up A qb) o Ic, 
+ M,w’ II- 7(-p) and M,w’ II- (~pAf+b) o1,4 
* M,w’//--(CC-pI A+) 01)) and 




(Filtration Corollary (a) ) 
(w E b&J*) 
(Filtration Theorem) 
(Truth condition) 
(Definition of cw* ) 
(Meta-reasoning) 
(M is an ALX model) 
and (U5)) 
((M,w II- (PA\) * M,j II- (pAti) 04) and 
(M, w II- (P A -4) 3 M, j /I- (P A -4) 0 4) and 
(M,w II- (-PA+) * M,j I(- (lpA$) 04) and 
(M,w II- (‘Pk+) * 
M,j /I- (-PAT+) 04) and 
M*,j II- CCI) 
=+ M,_i II- (CI 
(Definition of cw* ) 
(Filtration Lemma) 
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For any p E @s: 
Case 1: M,w II- (PA (4 A@>). 
M,w II- (PA (+A$)) 
=+ M,w II- (PA41 (Meta-reasoning) 
73 M,j II- (PA41 04 (j E Cw*(Wu4nD,*), 
+ tv,j II- (PA(+A+)) o(+~$) (Mvj II-+ and W8’)) 
Case2: M,wII-pA+~A@) ~M,wIl-(pAl~)V(PA~~). 
Case 2.1: 
M, w I/- (P A -4) 
* M,j II- (p A -4) 0 4 
* M,j II- (PA~~)o(#A~CI) 
* M,j II- (PA~$JVPA~)O(#A@/) 
=s M,j II- (PA~(~A$))o(~A$) 
tj E cw*tw, Ud4,.>> 
(M, j II- $ and W)) 
(MONU) 
(Meta-reasoning) 
Case 2.2: M, w II- p A +. 
Case 2.2.1: 
M> w II- 4 
* M*, w II- 4 
=+ {w} = cw*(w, [i&f*, 
+ w=j 
* M, j II- -4 
+ False 
Case 2.2.2: 
M, w II- -4 
* M,w II- (PA+) 
* M,j II- (P A -4) 0 do 
(Filtration Lemma) 
((32) 
(j E cw*(w,[+I,.)) 
(M, w II- 3) 
(M,j II- ti> 
(Meta-reasoning) 
(j E cw*(w,[+],-)) 
* M,j I/- (pA-$)o(+ArCI) tU6) 
+ M,j II- (pAT4VpA-l) o(4AccI) (MONV 
* M,j I/- (PA-(~A$)) o(+A$I> (Meta-reasoning) 
Case 3: 
M,w II- ‘PA (4Ar\ccI) 
* M,w II- ‘PAN (Meta-reasoning) 
* M,j I(- (-PA 4) 04 tj E cw*(w,[41iM-)) 
* M,j I\- (-PA(~A$)) 04 CM, j II- Cc, and (W’) 1 
* M,jII-(?pA(~Aclr))o(~A~) (U4) 
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Case4: M,wI)- (~pA~(qhAq)) ~~,wII-(lpA~~)V(pA~~). 
Case 4.1: 
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M, w II- t-p A -4) 
=+ M,j II- (-PA+) 04 tj E cw*tw$$n,*)> 
=+ M,j I/- (-PA+) 0(4Acl/) CM, j II- $ and UJ6) > 
=+ M,j II- (-pA+VpA+) o(4AccI) (MONV 
+ M,j II- (-PAT(~A$)) o(+A@) (Meta-reasoning) 
Case 4.2: M, w II- lp A +. 
Case 4.2.1: 
M, w II- 4 
=+ M*,w II- Cp (Filtration Lemma) 
=+ {w} = cw*tw, pII,*) (CS2) 
=+ w=j (j E cw*(w, [@I,.)) 
* M, j II- % (M, w II- 3) 
+ False (M,j /I- 9) 
Case 4.2.2: 
M, w II- + 
=+ M,w II- (-PA+,) (Meta-reasoning) 
* M,j II- (-PAT+) 04 (j E cw*(w, id],.)) 
=+ M,j II- (TPA+) 0 (4A+) (U6) 
* M,j /I- (-PA~~VPA-$) o(@AccI) (MONU) 
* M,j II- (-PAT(~A~CI)) o(~A$) (Meta-reasoning) 
Therefore, by the results of Cases l-4 and the definition of cw*, we have that j E 
CW* ( W, [I4 A @l] M* ) . So (CSC) is satisfied. 
(NORM) (0 #* X). We must show that 0 t* X + False. 
CM, w II- qSP$ and 
cw*(w,[4A7$q,,J =0and 
cw*(w,~+A+&,,,) =Xand 
cw*(w, [[4 A 3],.) +* 
CW*(W,[J/ A7&,&) (Definition of t- ) 
+ cw*(w, uq,.) +* 
cw*(w, [[fi A -#$,_J (cw*(w, [I],.) = 8 by (Gil)) 
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cw* (w, [IJIM* ) ** 
cw*(w, [I) A-d],.) and 
L E @s and 
3P E @x’( U&* = [[Cc, A +jM* ) (Definition of @s) 
cw* ( w, [I A yPjM* ) +* 
cw* ( w, up A llnM* ) (Meta-reasoning) 
M, w II- iPp (Definition of cw*) 
False (N) 
The proof for the second part of (NORM), (X #* 0)) is similar. 
(TRAN) cw*(w,XnY) +* cw*(w,Ynx) andcw*(w,YnZ) >-* cw*(w,Znr) + 
cw*(w,xnZ) +* c~*(w,znX). 
cw*(w,XnY) +* cw*(w,Ynx) and 
cw*(w,rn'i) k* ~w*(w,znY) 
+ 3@,b,3p( X = [I+],, and Y = [$],, and 
Z = udw* and M, w I)- (dP$) and 
M, w II- ($Pp) and (~$,ti,p E @i,+)) (Definition of cw*) 
* M,w I/- @‘p and (6~ E @;) (TR) 
+ cw* ( w, 14 A lpnw* ) t* cw* ( W, up A +n,. ) (Definition of >* ) 
+ cw*(w,xnZ) +* cw*(w,znX) (Definitions of X, Y, Z) 
As a consequence, M* is an ALX model. Because of the soundness of ALX logic, we 
know that for any p, kALX p =+ Vw( M*, w II- p) . This means that ALX also satisfies 
condition (2) of the finite model property (Definition 9). So ALX has the finite model 
property. 0 
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